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Abstract
O¢ cial Development Aid ows are volatile, non-predictable and not delivered
in a transparent way. All these features reinforce asymmetric information between
the citizens and the recipient government about the amount of aid ows received by
developing countries. This article uses a political economy model of rent extraction
to show how this asymmetry (i) encourages rent extraction by kleptocratic regimes,
thus reducing aid e¢ ciency, and (ii) increases the negative impact of aid volatility.
It identies a new channel the "asymmetric information" channel through which
aid volatility is costly for recipient countries. The empirical relevance of the model is
conrmed on a panel data of developing countries. Using various specications and
econometric methods, and developing new yearly estimates of aid volatility, I show
that (i) introducing more information increases aid e¢ ciency, that (ii) the negative
impact of aid volatility on aid e¢ ciency vanishes once one controls for information,
and that (iii) this positive impact of information does not come from the fact that
more transparent countries tend to have better institutions.
JEL: F35, P16, 010, D82.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This article uses a political economy model of rent extraction to study the incentives
that make a government in a recipient country willing to favor its private interest rather
than the public interest when it receives o¢ cial development aid ows. It is shown that
the recipient government takes advantage of both uncertainty and non-transparency that
characterize aid ows in order to increase the amounts of rents it extracts at the expense
of public goods provision, thus reducing the e¢ ciency of aid, i.e. its e¤ectiveness in
generating development per dollar transferred.
Rents can be extracted from two sources: (i) power when a government takes
o¢ ce, citizens temporarily delegate to it the exclusive decision-making authority and so
the use of aid ows; and (ii) asymmetric information the government has access to
better information on the amount of aid ows received than the rest of the population
(Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 1997). This asymmetry comes from the combination of
aid uncertainty and non transparency.
Aid uncertainty may stem from the lack of predictability of aid ows. It is then
dened as the di¤erence between what the donors commit to give and what they really
disburse (Celasun and Walliser, 2008; Borensztein, Cagé, Cohen, and Valadier, 2008).
It may also result from the volatility of aid ows. Quite strikingly, recent studies have
found that aid is even more volatile than tax revenues (Fielding and Mavrotas, 2005;
Bulir and Hamann, 2006). The problem is that this volatility cannot always be regarded
as resulting from the fact that "aid is coming at the right time", since aid appears to be
mildly procyclical (Gemmel and McGillivray, 1998; Pallage and Robe, 2001).
Moreover, besides being uncertain, aid is not delivered according to some recipient
economic characteristics or e¢ cient allocation criteria. Empirical studies on the de-
terminants of aid ows have emphasized that the main determinants are political and
strategic considerations, rather than economic needs of the recipient countries (Alesina
and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002). This pattern of allocation reinforces the non
transparency that characterizes the use of aid ows and gives the recipient government
an informational advantage over its citizens (Brautigam, 2000)1. Having discretion in
the use of aid ows, which are fungible resources, the recipient government can extract
rents rather than providing public goods2.
1For example, in Tanzania, 70 percent of donor nancing was not included in the 1996/97 budget
(Moon, 1998).
2 In this paper, mainly for data availability reasons, I focus on capture and rent extraction at the
national level. However, capture may occur subnationally or by regional leaders, as shown for example
by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) for Uganda.
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Encouraging rent extraction by kleptocratic regimes, asymmetric information about
aid thus reduces aid e¢ ciency. I identify a new channel the "asymmetric information"
channel  through which "bad" aid volatility is costly for recipient countries. This
channel is the combination of volatility (ex ante asymmetric information between donors
and recipients) with the lack of transparency (ex post asymmetric information between
citizens and their government in the recipient country) that characterizes aid ows and
reduces aid e¢ ciency. Indeed, there are two di¤erent sources of information failures in
aid contracting mechanisms. The rst information failure is aid uncertainty that weakens
the contract between donors and recipients and comes from donors erratic behavior. The
second one comes from the fact that citizens lack information about the amount of aid
received by the government. Citizens thus cannot monitor the governments behavior
well. It is the case in "kleptocratic" regimes, where the government provides its citizens
with some public goods, rather than to take all the wealth of the state for its own use,
only if it is in its self-interest.
To gure out the governments trade-o¤ between rent extraction and public goods
provision, I model electoral competition as "post-election politics" (Persson and Tabellini,
1999). Following Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), I assume that citizens do not com-
pare political platforms proposed by di¤erent candidates and then elect the candidate
with the best platform, but base their choice on the present skills of the incumbent.
They hold the incumbent accountable for past performance and there is no commitment
to policies before elections take place. The only way citizens can punish the incumbent
is by not reelecting her: elections serve the purpose of holding the politicians account-
able to backward-looking citizens. The incumbent runs against a single opponent, who
is drawn at random from a large set of candidates. Candidates are not inherently dif-
ferent in their competence or in any other attributes, so the importance of challengers
lies entirely in their availability. Each period, the policymaker observes the amount of
aid she receives; however, this information is not necessarily available to the citizens
(asymmetric information). When it is allocated in a transparent way, the amount of aid
is common knowledge. When such is not the case, the citizens only know the distribution
of the random variable aid.
Because of the voting rule, the incumbent faces an intertemporal trade-o¤: if she ex-
tracts too much rents today, she cannot satisfy the citizensexpectations and must forego
re-election and rents tomorrow. So the reason for which the incumbent refrains from
excessive diversion of resources today is that she wants to be able to continue holding
o¢ ce and diverting some resources tomorrow. However, since all aid recipient countries
are not countries with democratic elections, the model is written in such a way that it
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can be reinterpreted as a model of nondemocratic regimes, the government providing
public goods or making concessions to the military in order to avoid a revolution rather
than in order to be reelected3.
More precisely, the model is a two-agent an incumbent and a representative citizen
political economy model of rent extraction. The utility of the citizen is a function of
the amount of public goods she receives. The utility of the incumbent is a function of
the amount of rents she extracts and of the utility she gains from taking o¢ ce. The
incumbent extracts rents and provides public goods using the aid ows she receives. Aid
is modeled as a non-zero mean stationary positive autoregressive process of order one.
At the end of each period, the incumbent stays in power if and only if she provided the
citizen with the minimum amount of public goods the latter wants.
I show that the combination of aid volatility and non transparency sharply reduces
aid e¢ ciency. Both smoothing and transparency would reduce the amount of rents
the recipient government can extract.This may help explain why historically very few
developing countries have attempted to insure themselves against aid shocks. Moreover,
this helps explain why the incumbent does not have interest in the allocation of aid ows
being more transparent.
In order to test the relevance of the main results of the model, I assess empirically the
impact of asymmetric information on aid e¢ ciency and aid volatility, using panel data of
developing countries. While the model is mainly focused on public goods provision, the
empirical ndings are related to economic growth. Indeed, for data availability reasons,
this allows me to use a larger panel. Moreover, it has been shown in the literature that
the provision of public goods  e.g. education or infrastructures  by a government
promotes economic e¢ ciency and growth (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2003).
Using various specications and econometric methods, and developing new yearly
estimates of aid volatility, I show that (i) more transparency increases aid e¢ ciency, and
that (ii) aid volatility reduces aid e¢ ciency but that this e¤ect vanishes once I control
for information. These results are robust to controlling for other country characteristics
and for decreasing returns of aid e¢ ciency, and to the inclusion of period and country
xed e¤ects. I also provide evidence of the fact that, through my information proxies,
I capture e¤ectively the e¤ect of information and not measure indirectly the e¤ect of
institutions. Hence, making di¤erent robustness checks, I conclude that data support
the results of the model.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 sets up a political economy model of rent extraction. Section 4 studies
3See e.g. Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2008).
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the equilibrium to investigate the e¤ects of aid asymmetric information on aid e¢ ciency.
Section 5 provides empirical evidence conrming the models prediction that asymmet-
ric information reduces aid e¢ ciency and increases the negative impact of aid volatility.
Section 6 concludes.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
This article is related to models of bargaining over resources in the context of political
decision-making and in the tradition of principal-agent approaches to politics. I assume
that citizens hold the incumbent accountable for past performance and that there is
no commitment to policies before elections take place as in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn
(1986). After the election, the incumbent has an incentive to follow its most preferred
policy (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997; Acemoglu, Ticchi, and
Vindigni, 2006; Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin, 2006). This lack of commitment and
this no enforcement of electoral promises imply an agency problem between citizens and
their representatives, with contractual incompleteness (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini,
1997, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 1999). This approach is widely used in the political
budget/business cycle literature (Alesina, 1988; Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988; Rogo¤, 1990;
Alesina and Tabellini, 1990).
One of the contributions of this article is to apply this framework to developing coun-
tries, and more precisely to the question of development aid e¢ ciency and aid volatility.
There is a growing literature on aid e¢ ciency that tries to determine how foreign aid af-
fects economic growth. Some authors argue that aid raises growth in countries with good
policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002,
2004; Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004), others that is does so in countries with di¢ cult en-
vironment (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), or mainly outside the tropics (Dalgaard,
Hansen, and Tarp, 2004), or in average with diminishing returns (Hansen and Tarp,
2001). However, the debate is still opened (Roodman, 2007). This article is related to
this literature and gives some tools in order to reinterpret its sometimes contradictory
ndings. In particular, it underlines the importance of taking into account information,
both in the relationship between donors and recipients (aid volatility and predictability),
and inside the recipient country (accountability of the recipient government).
As to aid volatility, a rst strand of the literature underlines that this volatility
is costly for recipient countries (Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and reduces aid e¢ ciency
(Kharas, 2008). A second strand examines the channels through which this cost of aid
volatility operates (Cassen, 1994). At the macroeconomic level, aid volatility would cause
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volatility in some aggregate variables such as ination (Fielding and Mavrotas, 2005),
real exchange rates (Schnabel, 2007), or scal policy (Fatas and Mihov, 2005). Volatility
in these variables, in turn, would reduce aggregate growth. While this literature is only
empirical and focused on the macroeconomic transmission channels of aid volatility, this
article provides a theoretical model that takes into account the incentives of the agents
inside the recipient country. This is an important contribution since this theoretical
approach allows me to present a channel that, as far as I know, has not been examined
in the past literature. It consists in studying the joint e¤ect of aid volatility and lack
of transparency on aid e¢ ciency. Moreover, it gives some intuition on how aid can be
made more e¢ cient even in cases when it cannot be smoothed.
The literature that studies the link between transparency and accountability is also
related to my work. Stromberg (2004) illustrates how between 1933 and 1935 the United
States federal assistance to low-income households was greater in counties where more
households had radios and thus were better informed about government policies and pro-
grams (see also Florini (1999)). Kaufmann and Bellver (2005) emphasizes that trans-
parency is important not only because it increases the e¢ ciency in the allocation of
resources, but also because it may help in ensuring that the benets of growth are redis-
tributed and not captured by the elite. Similarly, in this article, I underline the fact that
giving more information about the aid ows to the citizens can increase aid e¢ ciency..
3 THE MODEL
The model is a multi-period political economy model of rent extraction. There are
two agents: the incumbent and the representative citizen of the recipient country. Each
period, the incumbent has to choose whether to use the aid she receives to provide public
goods to the citizen or to extract rents. At the end of each period, the citizen decides
whether or not she wants the incumbent to stay in power.
3.1 Timing of the Model and Informational Framework
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
1. In the rst step, nature chooses the value taken by the random variable "aid". The
government receives  dollars as resources, which can be used to provide public
goods to the representative citizen (g) and/or taken as rents by the incumbent
(r). The distribution of  is common knowledge. The realization of  is always
observed by the incumbent, but can be unknown to the citizen.
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2. In the second step, the citizen chooses the minimum amount of public goods she
wants
eg in order to re-elect (or not to takeover if it is a nondemocratic regime)
the incumbent.
3. In the third step, the incumbent chooses her political platform l = (g; r) ; with
g + r  :
4. Then elections take place.
5. Finally, nature plays by choosing 0 and the game starts again.
The random variable  is modeled as a non-zero mean stationary positive autore-
gressive process of order one:
t = (1  )  + t 1 + "t (1)
with 0 <  < 1. " is a normally distributed white noise with a constant variance 2" and
is not subject to autocorrelation (cov ("t; "s) = 0, t 6= s): "  N
 
0; 2"

.
By (1),
t  N

;
1  2t
1  2 
2
"

: (2)
t1
Nature: value of aid
t2
Voter: choice of  reservation
utility (minimum amount of
public goods)
t3
Incumbent: choice of
political platform (public
goods and rents)
t4
Elections
Figure 1: Timing of Events
The solution concept is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
3.2 Citizen
To gain further insights into the results, I concentrate on the two-period case which cap-
tures the basic intuitions. The main results are unaltered when the analysis is extended
to the innitely repeated case (Appendix A).
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The citizen maximizes her expected utility:
U = g1 + E
g
2;
with  the discount rate and gt the amount of public goods provided by the incumbent
at time t (t = 1; 2). The utility of the citizen is thus an increasing function of the amount
of public goods she receives.
3.3 Incumbent
R > 0 denotes the welfare i.e., the exogenous rents the incumbent gains from being in
power. It corresponds to the "ego rents" in Rogo¤ (1990)s terminology or to the "spoils
of o¢ ce" in Osborne and Slivinski (1996)s one. rt stands for the endogenous rent
extracted by the incumbent at time t. As discussed in Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
(1997), we can think of r as an outright diversion of resources, such as corruption
or party nancing, or more generally as an allocation of resources benecial to the
incumbents private agenda and completely ine¢ cient from the citizens viewpoint. Let
p be the probability of winning the elections. The incumbent chooses (r1; 
g
1; 
r
2; 
g
2) to
maximize (
V = v (r1; R) + p

g1;
eg1 E [v (r2; R)]
s:t: rt + 
g
t  t; t 2 f1; 2g
;
where
p

g1;
eg1 =
(
1 if g1  eg1
0 otherwise
and
v (r1; R) =
(
r1 +R if p = 1;
1 +R otherwise.
The constant 0    1 stands for the fact that running away with all the aid ows
is costly for the incumbent: she has to sacrice a part (1  ) of the ows she embezzles.
Because there are only two periods, the incumbent will embezzle all the aid re-
ceived in the second period ("lame-duck e¤ect" à la Barro (1973)) so that g2 = 0 and
E [v (r2; R)] = E (2) +R. According to (1),
E (2) = (1  )  + 1
from which
E [v (r2; R)] = 

 + 
 
1   

+R:
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An important point is that the model is written in such a way that it can also t the
case of some developing countries where there are not democratic elections. Indeed, it
can be reinterpreted as a model of nondemocratic regimes. In this case, the incumbent
provides public goods to the citizens or makes concessions to the military in order to
avoid a revolution rather than to be reelected,and (1  p) can be interpreted as the
probability of a revolution.
4 THE EQUILIBRIUM
4.1 Complete information
4.1.1 The Policymakers Choice
The policymaker faces a trade-o¤: she can (i) either satisfy the expectations of the citizen
so as to be re-elected, or (ii) extract the maximum rent without seeking re-election. In
order to solve this trade-o¤, I compute the policymakers welfare in (i) and (ii) and
compare them.
(i) The policymaker satises the expectations of the citizen. The policymakers opti-
mization programme is
max
g1
(1   g1) +R+  fE2 +Rg s.t. g1 > eg1;
where E2 =    
 
   1

. Since the policymakers objective is decreasing in g1, the
"re-election" constraint g1 > eg1 is active. Consequently, in the optimum,(
g1 =
eg1;
r1 = 1   eg1;
so that
V =

1   eg1+R+  [E2 +R] :
(ii) The policymaker does not satisfy the expectations of the citizen, in which case
the incumbent is not reelected. So, (
g1 = 0
r1 = 1
;
and
V = 1 +R:
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The following Proposition is obtained.
Proposition 1 In the optimum, the policymaker satises the expectations of the citizen
so as to be re-elected i¤
(1  ) 1 +  [E2 +R]  eg1
, [1   (1  )] 1 +  (1  )  + R  eg1: (3)
Hence, there is a reservation utility threshold under which the policymaker decides
to satisfy the expectations of the citizen so as to be re-elected. This threshold depends
on three parameters: (i) it is a decreasing function of 1, the amount of aid received
in period 1; (ii) an increasing function of , the average level of the aid ows; and (iii)
an increasing function of R, the ego rents. The basic intuition is as follows: all the
parameters that increase the utility of the incumbent in the second period decreases
her reservation threshold since they increase her willingness to stay in power. On the
contrary, the higher the amount of aid she receives today, i.e. the more rents she can
potentially extract today, the higher her reservation threshold since she can obtain a
higher utility level by choosing not to be reelected today.
4.1.2 The Citizens Choice
The representative citizen would like to receive as much public goods as possible. To this
aim, she chooses the maximum reservation utility eg1 compatible with (3), i.e.,
eg1 = (1  ) 1 +  [E2 +R] : (4)
Hence, the citizen must be particularly careful when setting her reservation utility: she
must endeavour not to set a reservation utility which would be so high that the policy-
maker would choose not to satisfy her expectations. This is why she must leave some
"discretion rent" to the policymaker in order to prevent her from embezzling all public
resources.
Notice that here, the rents just come from the fact the incumbent has discretion over
the use of aid ows, since there are no informational rents in the complete information
case.
4.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
In the equilibrium,
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g1
1
= min
n
(1  ) +  E2+R1 ; 1
o
= min

(1  ) +  [ ( 1)]+R1 ; 1

:
(5)
There is a threshold value of 1 under which the o¢ ceholder devotes all the aid
received to the provision of public goods. This threshold can be characterized as follows
(1  ) +  

        1+R
1
 1, 1  

R+  (1  ) 
1   :
This threshold increases with the average amount of aid received by the incumbent
and with the non monetary benet R the incumbent gains from being in power.
Above this threshold, the fraction of the aid ows devoted to the provision of public
goods is equal to
1   +  

        1+R
1
: (6)
This fraction is a function of the current amount of aid ows received 1 and of the
average amount of aid ows : It decreases with 1: when the amount of aid is su¢ ciently
high, the share of the resources used for the public goods decreases with the amount of
aid received. In Figure 2, I plot a simple simulation to illustrate this result. The x-axis
represents the amount of aid ows received by the incumbent (), normalized between 0
and 1. The y-axis indicates the share of the aid ows devoted to public goods (g=). If
one considers the blue line, it appears that below a certain value of  (0:3 in the Figure),
aid ows are entirely devoted to the provision of public goods, and that above this value,
the higher the aid ows, the lower the share devoted to public goods. This result is in
the spirit of Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2003) who underline that greater foreign
aid relaxes the budget constraint of the ruler.
However, this result does not mean that the higher the aid ows, the less e¢ cient
aid. Indeed, the fraction devoted to public goods increases with . Moreover, as we
underlined, the threshold value also increases in . As shown in Figure 2, the higher
the average amount of aid, the more e¢ cient aid: when the average amount of aid ows
increases, the curve moves to the right (from the blue curve to the dashed purple curve).
Hence, aid ine¢ ciency does not come from the fact that a country receives a high amount
of aid in absolute terms (which is the current view of decreasing returns of aid) but from
the fact that it receives a high amount compared to the amount it is used to receive.
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Figure 2: Aid E¢ ciency and Average Amount of Aid Flows under Complete Information
4.2 Asymmetric Information
With asymmetric information, the citizen is unable to distinguish the actions of the
policymaker from exogenous events. Hence, if the policymaker o¤ers few public goods,
she cannot determine whether this is due to a high level of rent extraction by the policy-
maker (a high r) or to a low level of aid (a low ): This alters the citizens reservation
utility and thus, the choice of the policymaker.
4.2.1 The Policymakers Choice
Given eg; the choice of the policymaker is the same as under symmetric information:
g1 =
( eg1 if 1  1;
0 otherwise,
with
1 =
eg1    [E (2) +R]
1   : (7)
4.2.2 The Citizens Choice
The citizen wants to maximize the amount of public goods she will receive (eg1), but
she knows that the higher her reservation utility, the higher the probability that the
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incumbent chooses to embezzle all aid (which is the case if 1 < E1 (1)). She maximizes:
maxeg1 eg1 Pr f1  E1 (1)g = eg1  (1  F [E1 (1)]) :
Since the citizen does not observe the realization of 1, she assumes that E (2) = 
and so E1 (1) =
eg1 [+R]
1  .
Using rst-order condition,
eg1 = (1  ) 1  F [E1 (1)]f [E1 (1)] ; (8)
which implicitly denes the citizens reservation utility.
The hazard rate which corresponds to the inverse of the second factor in (8) is
monotonically increasing in  for a normal law. Hence, the reservation utility of the
citizen is increasing in R,  and . In other words, the reservation utility of the citizen
increases with all the parameters whose rise increases the utility of the incumbent in the
case she wins the elections.
4.2.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Proposition 2 In the subgame perfect equilibrium,
g1
1
=
8<: 0 if 1 <
1
1 +
h
(1  ) 1 F [E1(1)]f [E1(1)]   

 (1  )  +Ri
min
n
(1 )
1
1 F [E1(1)]
f [E1(1)]
; 1
o
otherwise
; (9)
with
1  F [E1 (1)]
f [E1 (1)]
=
1  1
"
p
2
R E1(1)
 1 e
  (x )
22" dx
1
"
p
2
e
 
eg1 [1+(1 )] R
(1 )2

=22"
:
4.2.4 Interpretation: A Simple Case
Figure 3 shows our results for the simple economy considered before. It combines the
results obtained under complete information (Dashed Red Curve) with those obtained
under asymmetric information (Plain Blue Curve). In the complete information case,
under a certain threshold, aid is very e¢ cient, all the aid ows being used in order to
provide public goods. But above this threshold, aid becomes less e¢ cient: when its
amount is increased, a bigger share of aid is extracted by the incumbent as rents. These
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rents only come from the fact that the incumbent is in power: "power rents".
Under asymmetric information, aid has an important multiplicative e¤ect: below a
certain threshold, all the aid received by the incumbent is extracted as rents while no
public good is provided. This is due to the fact that, under asymmetric information, the
citizen can involuntarily choose a reservation utility that is too high for the incumbent to
be willing to satisfy it. Above this threshold, aid e¢ ciency decreases with the amount of
aid as in the complete information case, but much more rapidly. Indeed, it clearly appears
that asymmetric information reduces aid e¢ ciency, the incumbent taking advantage of
it to extract more rent. In this case, she does not only extract "power rents" but also
"asymmetric information" rents.
Comp. info.
Asym. info.
Power rents
Asym. info. rents
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
g
Figure 3: Aid E¢ ciency under Complete and Asymmetric Information
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, I test the main predictions of the model in a panel of developing countries
over the 1970-2002 period. I rst examine the relationship among development aid, "in-
formation", and GDP growth. Using a release of information indicator, I nd that aid
has a positive impact on growth in developing countries where asymmetric information
is less important. I then construct a time-varying measure of volatility that I compute
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using a rolling window. I ask whether this volatility reduces aid e¢ ciency and whether
this is due to asymmetric information using di¤erent specications. A main nding is
that aid volatility sharply reduces aid e¢ ciency, but that this negative impact vanishes
once one introduces information. This conrms the fact that the "asymmetric informa-
tion" channel is an important channel through which aid volatility is costly for recipient
countries.
5.1 Data4
Panel data on development aid ows are taken from the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) annual series. Following Roodman (2006b), I use the Net Aid Trans-
fers (NAT) variable for measuring aid ows. NAT is a net transfers concept, net of both
principle payments received on ODA loans and of interests received on such loans. More-
over, NAT excludes cancellation of old non-ODA loans since such cancellation generates
little or no additional net transfers.
As a dependent variable in order to evaluate aid e¢ ciency, I use the growth rate
of per capita GDP. I then add usual controls in cross-country growth equations: the
log level of per capita GDP, the growth rate of the population, and M2 as a share of
GDP lagged one period. Depending on the specications, I also control for a measure
of institutions: the augmented Freedom House political rights index5.
The extent of asymmetric information is proxied by the release of information in-
dicator of Williams (2006, 2009). This indicator is based on the quantity of reported
socio-economic data contained in the two main international databases that are cur-
rently used extensively in economic analyses: the World Development Indicators (WDI)
produced by the World Bank, and the International Finance Statistics (IFS) database,
constructed by the International Monetary Fund6. The rst advantage of this release
of information indicator is its extensive coverage, both across countries (175) and time
(1960-2000)7. A second advantage is that this indicator is not a weak proxy for income
(and the level of development). Indeed, Williams (2009) provides anecdotal evidence
that, while incomes are undoutbedly a determinant of the amount of information re-
leased by all countries, they are not the only determinant: "a number of countries with
4For the description and the sources of the data, see Appendix A.
5The Freedom House measure is highly correlated with other usual measures of institutions (the Polity
IV Index and the Przeworski democracy index), and has the advantage to be better reported.
6Although each country has in some form its own statistical agency, and there are also many other
regional data collection bodies (for example, the OECD, or the Asian Development Bank), these two
databases ensure a commonality in methodology across all countries.
7Nearly 6,000 observations are recorded, giving an average of 34 annual observations for each country.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Per capita GDP growth Aid Aid Release of
GDP in 1970 (percent per annum) (percent of GDP) Volatility information
indicator
Mean 1352.02 3.39 8.88 0.19 0.46
Median 652.76 3.81 6.40 0.08 0.46
Standard deviation 2016.14 5.14 9.16 0.41 0.12
very di¤erent levels of per capita incomes produced very di¤erent levels of data, which
implies that there is something that leads countries to release relatively little information,
even though they could easily a¤ord to". Finally, the release of information indicator has
been constructed in part to answer questions that are closely related to the aim of this
paper, for example to understand the fact that information can help citizens monitor the
performance of their government and reduce the problems associated with informational
asymmetries between parties.
The aid data cover a large number of countries but the release of information indicator
is available only for 134 developing countries. Once I drop from these countries the ones
for which there is too many missing data for the control variables, I am left with a sample
of 87 countries. Table 1 provides summary statistics for a few key statistics8.
5.2 Aid E¢ ciency and Asymmetric Information
5.2.1 Empirical Specications
The equations are estimated using a panel across six four-years periods from 1974-1977
through 1994-19979. Thus, an observation is a countrys performance average over a four-
year period. The averaging over four-year, which is usual in the aid-growth literature
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani, 2004), allows me to avoid
the non stationnarity problem for the growth rate. The panel is unbalanced, with some
countries having more observations than others. When I estimate my regressions using
two-step system GMM, I thus use the forward orthogonal deviations transform instead
of rst di¤erencing, because it maximizes the sample size in panel with gaps (Roodman,
8The countries covered are listed in Table A1 which provides some country-specic information about
the variables that are the main focus of the analysis: per capita GDP, GDP growth, aid (percent of GDP),
aid volatility, and the release of information indicator.
9The dataset covers the period 1970-2002, but computing aid volatility using an eight-year rolling
window, the rst and last four years cannot be used for the regressions.
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2006a)10.
My baseline empirical specication is:
git = 0 + 1

aid
gdp

it
+ 2

aid
gdp
2
it
+3Xit + i + t + "it; (10)
where i = 1; :::; 87 index the recipients and t = 1; :::; 6 stand for the six four-year periods
(from 1974-1977 to 1994-1997). g is the growth rate of per capita GDP between two
periods t and t+111; (aid=gdp) are the aid ows normalized by the GDP; and (aid=gdp)2
are the square aid ows normalized by the GDP that I introduce in order to control for
decreasing returns of aid. Xit is a vector of control variables including the level of GDP
per capita, the growth rate of the population and M2 as a share of GDP lagged one
period in my baseline specication. Moreover, depending on the specications, I also
add a measure of institutions. i is a country xed e¤ect that I only introduce when I
estimate my regressions using OLS12; t is a period xed e¤ect
13; and "it is the error
term.
In section 4, I argue that the e¤ectiveness of aid would likely depend on the extent
of asymmetric information. To address this issue, I then introduce an interactive term,
(aid/GDP)information, into my regressions. My empirical specication is:
git = 0 + 1

aid
gdp

it
+ 2

aid
gdp

it
 informationit
+ 3informationit + 4Xit + i + t + "it; (11)
where information is the release of information indicator of Williams (2009). What I
am interested in is the marginal e¤ect of aid on growth, i.e. (1 + 2information). I
10The forward orthogonal deviations transform is an alternative to di¤erencing proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) that preserves sample size in panel with gaps. Indeed, instead of subtracting the
previous observation from the contemporaneous what does the rst-di¤erence transform which thus
magnies gaps in unbalanced panels , it subtracts the average of all future available observations of
a variable. No matter how many gaps, it is computable for all observations except the last for each
individual, so it minimizes data loss. And since lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are
valid instruments.
11However, the results are robust to the use of two alternative measures of the growth rate: (i) the
average of the growth rate over the four-year periods; and (ii) the average of the per capita growth rate
over the four-year periods.
12 Indeed, it is a mistake to introduce explicit xed e¤ects dummies when one uses system GMM,
because it might cause bias (Roodman, 2006a).
13The inclusion of time dummies is of crucial importance for the use of two-step system GMM. Indeed,
the autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coe¢ cient standard errors assume no correlation
across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time dummies make this assumption more likely to
hold.
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want to determine whether or not the e¤ect of a change in aid on growth depends on
the value of the release of information indicator.
I rst estimate equations (10) and (11) using both OLS with robust standard errors
and cluster countries14, and two-step system GMM with Windmeijer-corrected cluster-
robust errors (Windmeijer, 2005)15 and forward orthogonal deviations transform. In-
deed, as it is underlined below, there are some endogeneity concerns, and the advantage
of the system GMM method is that it can be used in the absence of any strictly ex-
ogenous explanatory variables or instruments. Aid is treated throughout this article as
an endogenous variable, and information as a predetermined and not strictly exogenous
variable.
Endogeneity Concerns Running OLS to evaluate the impact of aid on growth can
lead to biased results since aid can be endogenous. This endogeneity can come from
(i) reverse causation: growth causes aid (e.g. the higher its growth rate, the less aid a
country receives because it does not need it); or (ii) simultaneous causation: an omitted
variable causes both aid and growth.
In order to deal with these endogeneity problems, a rst solution would be to es-
timate equations (10) and (11) using instrumental variables. However, the exogenous
instruments that are commonly used in the literature have been criticized for being en-
dogenous. This is an important issue since the 2SLS estimators cannot yield unbiased
coe¢ cient estimates if even one of the instruments for current aid has a distinct e¤ect
on growth apart from the e¤ect realized by acting through current aid.
Since the aid e¢ ciency literature has not concluded to the existence of any strictly
exogenous instruments for aid, rather than using instrumental variables, I choose to use
two-step system GMM. Indeed, under cerain assumptions that are presented in the next
subsection, this method helps to overcome the endogeneity concerns when there are no
perfect instruments waiting in the wings.
Two-step System GMM Estimation The two-step system GMM are designed for
situations with: (i) few time periods and many individuals; (ii) a linear functional rela-
tionship; (iii) some endogenous regressors; (iv) other regressors that may be predeter-
mined but not strictly exogenous (meaning correlated with past and possibly current
realizations of the error); (v) a dynamic simple left-hand side variable (depending on
14 I do not cluster the countries when using two-step GMM, since in two-step estimations, errors are
already robust.
15Without this nite sample correction, the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased.
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its own past realizations); (vi) arbitrarily distributed countries xed e¤ects; (vii) het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation within countries but not across them16; and (vii) rst
di¤erences of instrument variables that are uncorrelated with the xed e¤ects (Roodman,
2006a).
These conditions are veried here. Indeed, I have only 6 time periods but 87 coun-
tries. My main regressor, aid, is endogenous, and information is predetermined but not
strictly exogenous. My left-hand side variable the growth rate of GDP depends on its
own past realizations. I introduce countries xed e¤ects in all the regressions. Finally,
I present with the estimation of each regression the result of the Arellano-Bond test
for autocorrelation that conrms that there is no autocorrelation aside from the xed
e¤ects.
It thus appears to be relevant to estimate the impact of aid, aid volatility and in-
formation on growth using two-step system GMM estimations here. Moreover, it is
an improvement over the past literature, since the results I obtain do not su¤er from
the biases that can come from the use of 2SLS estimators with not strictly exogenous
instruments.
5.2.2 Estimation Results
In Tables 2 and 3, I report results of the impact of aid on the growth rate, depending
or not on the extent of asymmetric information (estimation of equations (10) and (11)).
Using OLS, I nd a negative but not statistically signicant impact of aid on growth
when I do not control for decreasing returns of aid (columns 1 and 2). This impact turns
to be positive and statistically signicant once I control for decreasing returns (columns
3 and 4). I nd similar results when using system GMM (columns 5 to 8).
I then introduce the release of information indicator (Table 3). The prediction is that
of a positive 2 coe¢ cient for the e¤ect of aid on the growth rate in an environment where
asymmetric information is reduced (the release of information indicator is high). Using
OLS and system GMM and controlling or not for decreasing returns and a measure
of institutions, we see that the corresponding coe¢ cient has the anticipated sign and
is statistically signicant: aid has a positive impact on growth in a low asymmetric
information environment. Moreover, the only impact of information on the growth rate
is through aid, since the estimated coe¢ cient 3 for the release of information indicator
is not statistically signicant.
16The idiosyncratic disturbances (those apart from the xed e¤ects) may have individual-specic
patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, but the idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated
across individuals.
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Moreover, the system GMM results turn to be robust. Using the Arellano and
Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation, I nd AR(1) (which was to be expected, since
the regressions are run in rst di¤erence), but I reject AR(2), so my lags are valid
instruments. To test for over-identifying restrictions (of whether the instruments, as a
group, appear exogenous), I use the Hansen J-statistic, and nd that the validity of the
instruments is accepted. However, the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions can
be weakened by many instruments. In section 5.4.3, I show that these results are robust
to reducing the instrument count.
Finally, I will turn to this point in more details in section 5.5, but one has to note
that all the results are robust to the introduction of an institutional measure, and that
this introduction even increases the robustness of the results.
Marginal e¤ect of Aid on Growth However, as underlined by Brambor, Clark,
and Golder (2005), what I am directly interested in is not the signicance or the sign
of the parameter 2, but, since I use a multiplicative interaction model, the marginal
e¤ect of aid on growth, (1 + 2information). In order to convey the marginal e¤ect of
aid on growth, I present a simple gure (Figure 4) that graphically illustrates how the
marginal e¤ect of aid changes across the observed range of the release of information
indicator. The solid line in Figure 4 indicates this change. Any particular point on this
line is (1 + 2information), the coe¢ cients being estimated using system GMM. 95%
condence intervals around the line allow me to determine the conditions under which
aid has a statistically signicant impact on the growth rate of GDP. It is easy to see that
aid has a strong positive impact on growth when there is a lot of information, whereas
this impact is negative when the release of information indicator is low. Moreover, as
predicted, this positive impact increases as the release of information indicator increases.
This preliminary evidence is thus consistent with one of the main result of the model.
The other result that has to be tested is whether aid volatility has a negative impact on
growth, and whether the introduction of more information reduces this negative impact.
5.3 Aid Volatility and Asymmetric Information
5.3.1 Econometric Method to Compute Aid Volatility
I use a eight-year rolling window in order to compute a time-varying measure of aid
volatility. I rst normalize the aid ows by the population of each recipient country. I
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TABLE 2: AID EFFICIENCY
Estimation OLSa;b OLSa;b OLSa;b OLSa;b System System System System
method GMMc GMMc GMMc GMMc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
aid
gdp

-0.375 -0.308 1.191** 1.344** -0.097 -0.291 0.698* 0.514*
(0 .279) (0 .367) (0 .492) (0 .514) (0 .316) (0 .278) (0 .378) (0 .298)
aid
gdp
2
-0.031*** -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.019**
(0 .009) (0 .009) (0 .007) (0 .008)
Population 1.131 1.002 1.479 1.446 0.222 -0.794 -0.283 -1.066
growth (1 .220) (1 .224) (1 .094) (1 .124) (2 .758) (1 .639) (1 .961) (1 .771)
Log GDP pc 1.232 0.928 4.191 4.576 1.109 -1.421 2.550 0.462
(3 .215) (3 .504) (3 .317) (3 .622) (1 .938) (1 .830) (1 .881) (1 .247)
M2/GDP -0.004 -0.014 0.139* 0.145* 0.033 0.077** 0.103** 0.123*
(lag) (0 .044) (0 .044) (0 .075) (0 .086) (0 .048) (0 .034) (0 .049) (0 .065)
Freedom 5.739 2.501 4.905 2.814
House (4 .506) (4 .170) (6 .204) (4 .255)
Intercept -3.148 8.722 -34.473 -28.356 -5.237 10.783 -21.011 -5.769
(29.534) (17.415) (31.205) (20.763) (16.804) (11.540) (17.835) (10.983)
N 346 321 346 321 275 257 275 257
R2 0.661 0.665 0.691 0.696
2 95.48 96.189 112.944 129.621
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
All the regressions include period xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
a: The regressions include country xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
b: Robust standard errors and cluster(countries).
c: Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
Notes: The variables are described in more detail in the text. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP.
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TABLE 3: AID EFFICIENCY AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Estimation OLSa;b OLSa;b OLSa;b OLSa;b System System System System
method GMMc GMMc GMMc GMMc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
aid
gdp

-1.639*** -1.701*** -1.655*** -1.708*** -1.003* -1.147*** -0.829 -0.984**
(0 .385) (0 .457) (0.420) (0 .452) (0 .593) (0 .403) (0 .656) (0 .415)
aid
gdp

info 3.689*** 4.414*** 6.238*** 6.492*** 2.334* 2.890*** 2.898* 3.443***
(1 .088) (1 .255) (1.739) (1 .858) (1 .414) (0 .962) (1 .695) (1 .032)
aid
gdp
2info -0.139** -0.129 -0.072 -0.063
(0 .066) (0 .082) (0 .069) (0.053)
Release info. -5.254 -15.284 -19.562 -22.971 -1.248 -6.449 8.970 -0.808
(26.893) (27.309) (26.444) (27.666) (18.302) (11.266) (18.244) (10.899)
Population 0.782 0.699 1.126 1.039 -0.943 -1.454* -0.645 -1.193
growth (0 .889) (0 .879) (0.911) (0 .941) (2 .157) (0 .820) (2 .333) (1 .267)
Log GDP pc 2.157 3.414 4.786 5.323 0.748 0.923 1.167 1.962
(3 .248) (3 .474) (3.519) (3 .820) (1 .632) (1 .554) (1 .692) (1 .532)
M2/GDP 0.103* 0.102* 0.099* 0.103* 0.087 0.077 0.082 0.063
(lag) (0 .056) (0 .058) (0.059) (0 .060) (0 .063) (0 .060) (0 .062) (0 .054)
Freedom 1.618 0.957 4.159 4.016
House (4 .276) (4 .231) (3 .605) (3 .304)
Intercept -10.592 -7.414 -25.421 -20.764 -2.970 -3.947 -12.925 -15.553
(32.506) (19.890) (34.295) (22.258) (10.143) (10.013) (15.602) (14.714)
N 346 321 346 321 275 257 275 257
R2 0.683 0.692 0.695 0.698
2 182.389 479.477 167.761 431.035
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
All the regressions include period xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
a: The regressions include country xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
b: Robust standard errors and cluster(countries).
c: Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
Notes: The variables are described in more detail in the text. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP.
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Figure 4: Marginal E¤ect of Aid on Growth as Information Changes
then take the log of the series and smooth them using the Hodrick-Prescott technique
(with a smoothing parameter of 10017). I compute the volatility of the aid ows for
each country i and for each year t (with t = 1974,..., 1997) by taking the variance of the
detrended aid series between t  4 and t+ 3.
5.3.2 Empirical Specications
In order to test the volatility channel, I estimate the impact of the time-varying measure
of volatility I compute using the eight-year rolling window method. Since I have data
for the volatility series between 1974 and 1997, the equations are estimated using the
same panel as before across six four-year periods from 1974-1977 through 1994-1997. My
empirical specications are:
git =  0 +  1

aid
gdp

it
+  2

aid
gdp
2
it
+  3aidvolatilityit + 4Xit + t + i + "it; (12)
17However, the results I obtain are robust to the use of other values of the smoothing parameter.
Regression results for these other values are available upon request from the author.
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git = 0+1

aid
gdp

it
+2

aid
gdp
2
it
+3aidvolatilityit+4 [aidvolatilityit  informationit]
+ 5informationit + 6Xit + t + i + "it; (13)
where aidvolatility is the variance of the detrended aid series. I estimate equations (12)
and (13) using both OLS and two-step system GMM.
5.3.3 Estimation Results
I rst estimate the impact of aid volatility on the growth rate (equation (12)). The
prediction is that of a negative  3 coe¢ cient for the e¤ect on the growth rate of aid
volatility. In Table 4, for all the specications, we see that the coe¢ cient has the
anticipated sign and is statistically signicant: the higher aid volatility, the lower the
growth rate (columns 1 to 4). Moreover, the results are robust to the use of system
GMM (columns 5 to 8).
When I introduce the release of information indicator and the interaction term be-
tween this indicator and aid volatility (estimation of equation (13)) (Table 5), I nd that
while the 3 coe¢ cient for the e¤ect of aid volatility is still negative and statistically sig-
nicant, the 4 coe¢ cient for the interaction term is positive and statistically signicant.
In other words, the negative impact of aid volatility disappears in the environments with
low asymmetric information. It conrms the prediction of the model that aid volatility
only increases rent extraction when there is asymmetric information.
Moreover, as before, there is no autocorrelation of order 2, and the validity of the
instruments is accepted by the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions.
To estimate the marginal e¤ect of aid volatility on growth, I present as above a simple
gure (Figure 5) that graphically illustrates how the marginal e¤ect of aid volatility
changes across the observed range of the release of information indicator. It is easy
to see that aid volatility has a strong reductive e¤ect on the growth rate when there
is asymmetric information. As predicted, this reductive e¤ect declines as the degree
of information increases. Once the release of information indicator is above 0.6, aid
volatility no longer has a signicant reductive impact on economic growth.
This preliminary evidence thus conrms the main nding of the model: a channel
through which aid volatility has a negative impact is the asymmetric information channel.
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TABLE 4: AID VOLATILITY
Estim. OLSa,b OLSa,b OLSa,b OLSa,b System System System System
method GMMc GMMc GMMc GMMc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
aid
gdp
-0.328 -0.278 1.073** 1.248** -0.122 -0.277 0.504 0.444
(0.260) (0.349) (0.491) (0.513) (0.379) (0.303) (0.389) (0.300)
aid
gdp
2
-0.028*** -0.030*** -0.016** -0.017**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Aid vol. -13.141*** -12.211*** -10.385*** -10.042** -11.222*** -11.540*** -10.320*** -10.096***
(4.200) (4.250) (3.728) (3.815) (4.414) (3.372) (3.843) (3.802)
Pop. 0.847 0.797 1.220 1.245 -0.783 -1.305 -1.366 -1.366
growth (1.156) (1.171) (1.068) (1.112) (2.717) (1.330) (1.887) (1.355)
Log 1.734 1.406 4.295 4.703 1.476 -0.661 2.275 0.625
GDP pc (3.094) (3.391) (3.259) (3.551) (2.165) (1.970) (1.954) (1.164)
M2/GDP -0.011 -0.020 0.119 0.129 0.045 0.079** 0.094** 0.129**
(lag) (0.039) (0.041) (0.072) (0.083) (0.059) (0.035) (0.048) (0.064)
Freed. 3.199 0.648 4.154 3.318
House (4.552) (4.321) (6.942) (3.524)
Interc. -2.295 8.413 -30.699 -25.909 -4.087 8.492 -13.697 -5.457
(28.404) (17.014) (30.764) (20.519) (19.301) (12.393) (18.725) (10.832)
N 346 321 346 321 275 257 275 257
R2 0.677 0.679 0.701 0.705
e2 91.554 123.864 138.585 200.973
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All the regressions include period fixed effects (coefficients not reported).
a: The regressions include country fixed effects (coefficients not reported).
b: Robust standard errors and cluster(countries).
c: Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
Notes: The variables are described in more detail in the text. The dependent variable is the grow th rate of GDP.
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TABLE 5: AID VOLATILITYAND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Estimat. OLSa,b OLSa,b OLSa,b OLSa,b System System System System
method GMMc GMMc GMMc GMMc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
aid
gdp
-0.219 -0.162 0.827 0.990* -0.135 -0.198 0.259 0.401
(0.206) (0.273) (0.518) (0.549) (0.252) (0.226) (0.388) (0.341)
aid
gdp
2
-0.021** -0.023** -0.008 -0.013**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Aid vol. -98.421** -100.694** -75.728* -76.957* -106.175** -101.052** -89.957*** -81.403***
(37.714) (41.171) (39.704) (43.041) (53.586) (43.667) (31.222) (29.627)
Aid vol.× 162.914** 167.873** 123.353* 125.798* 175.910* 171.379** 150.862*** 135.285***
info. (64.893) (71.073) (68.094) (74.055) (92.777) (74.365) (54.020) (51.062)
Relea info. -12.585 -21.125 -14.048 -20.489 -12.764 -28.204* -11.128 -7.319
(24.506) (27.018) (23.858) (26.207) (21.738) (15.476) (13.144) (12.683)
Population 0.174 0.130 0.634 0.657 -2.701 -1.096 -2.356* -2.316*
growth (0.941) (0.958) (1.017) (1.077) (1.887) (1.381) (1.427) (1.351)
Log GDP 1.425 1.450 3.577 4.098 0.157 0.020 1.210 0.786
pc (2.915) (3.425) (3.208) (3.681) (2.076) (1.336) (1.321) (1.372)
M2/GDP -0.031 -0.040 0.073 0.079 0.076* 0.068** 0.086** 0.100**
(lag) (0.038) (0.041) (0.066) (0.074) (0.042) (0.029) (0.039) (0.046)
Freed. 2.510 0.751 5.173 0.526
House (4.620) (4.426) (5.054) (4.912)
Intercept -2.591 20.778 -22.086 -7.033 13.148 16.565 2.302 1.731
(30.329) (21.825) (33.501) (25.901) (14.604) (12.207) (14.529) (14.941)
N 346 321 346 321 275 257 275 257
R2 0.700 0.703 0.713 0.717
e2 206.393 170.328 268.43 208.937
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All the regressions include period fixed effects (coefficients not reported).
a: The regressions include country fixed effects (coefficients not reported).
b: Robust standard errors and cluster(countries).
c: Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
Notes: The variables are described in more detail in the text. The dependent variable is the grow th rate of GDP.
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Figure 5: Marginal E¤ect of Aid Volatility on Growth As Information Changes
5.4 Aid E¢ ciency, Aid Volatility and Asymmetric Information
In this section, I nally test the impact of aid volatility on aid e¢ ciency, since the model
predicts that aid volatility reduces aid e¢ ciency when there is asymmetric information.
5.4.1 Empirical Specications
My empirical specications are:
git = '0+'1

aid
gdp

it
+'2

aid
gdp

it
 aidvolatilityit

+'3aidvolatilityit+'4Xit+t+i+"it:
(14)
git = 0+1

aid
gdp

it
+2informationit+3aidvolatilityit+4

aid
gdp

it
 informationit

+ 5

aid
gdp

it
 aidvolatilityit

+ 6 [aidvolatilityit  informationit]
+ 7

aid
gdp

it
 aidvolatilityit  informationit

+ 8Xit + t + i + "it: (15)
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The estimation of equation (14) allows me to determine (i) to what extent the nega-
tive impact of aid volatility on growth comes from the fact that it reduces aid e¢ ciency,
and (ii) how aid volatility a¤ects aid e¢ ciency. In equation (15) I introduce the release
of information indicator in order to test one of the main predictions of the model: the
negative impact of aid volatility on aid e¢ ciency comes from the asymmetry of informa-
tion.
5.4.2 Estimation Results
The prediction is that of a negative '2 coe¢ cient for the e¤ect on the growth rate of
the interaction term between aid normalized by GDP and aid volatility. In columns
1 and 2 and 5 and 6 of Table 6, we see that the coe¢ cient has the anticipated sign:
aid has a negative impact on growth when aid ows are very volatile. However, as
predicted by the model, the negative impact of aid volatility on aid e¢ ciency vanishes
when information is introduced (columns 7 and 8). Indeed, when I estimate equation
(15) with two-step system GMM, the interaction term between aid and aid volatility is
negative and statistically signicant, while the triple interaction term between aid, aid
volatility and information is positive and statistically signicant. Moreover, there is no
autocorrelation of order 2, and the validity of the instruments is accepted by the Hansen
J-test.
Finally, I turn to the marginal e¤ect of aid on growth which is :
1+4information+5aidvolatility+7informationaidvolatility18 in equation (15). In
Figure 6, I present the marginal e¤ect of aid on growth for all the values of the release
of information indicator and three di¤erent values of aid volatility: a low value (0.4 
blue line), an intermediate value (0.6 green line) and a high value (0.8 red line)19. It
appears clearly that (i) the higher aid volatility, the higher the negative impact of aid
on growth for low levels of information; (ii) the negative impact of aid volatility on aid
e¢ ciency disappears from a certain level of the release of information indicator. In other
words, as predicted by the model, the negative impact of aid volatility on aid e¢ ciency
comes from the asymmetric information channel.
18The variance of this quantity is var (b1)+information2  var (b4) + aidvolatility2 
var (b5)+information2  aidvolatility2  var (b7) + 2informationcov (b1b4) + 2  aidvolatility 
cov (b1b5) + 2informationaidvolatility  cov (b1b7) + 2informationaidvolatility  cov (b4b5) + 2 
aidvolatilityinformation2  cov (b4b7) + 2informationaidvolatility2  cov (b5b7).
19The plot indicates statistical signicance through the use of stars rather than condence intervals in
order for the plot not to become cluttered.
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TABLE 6: AID EFFICIENCY, AID VOLATILITY
AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Estimation OLSa OLSa OLSa OLSa System System System System
method GMMb GMMb GMMb GMMb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
aid
gdp

0.285 0.349 -0.453 -0.307 0.599** 0.269 0.572 0.946
(0 .235) (0 .274) (0 .847) (0 .888) (0.282) (0.204) (0 .732) (0 .632)
Release of info. -21.114 -27.076 8.918 1.580
(30.227) (31.778) (19.058) (12.840)
Aid volatility -7.603*** -6.351** -58.585* -62.302 -1.255 -4.400 -45.007* -46.049**
(2 .704) (2 .733) (34.681) (37.576) (3.516) (3.045) (23.016) (21.346)
aid
gdp

info. 1.614 1.359 -1.002 -2.063
(2 .267) (2 .357) (1 .718) (1 .387)
aid
gdp

aid vol. -2.020*** -2.356*** -1.958 -2.386 -2.590*** -2.270** -4.410** -5.424***
(0 .616) (0 .802) (1 .867) (1 .963) (0.865) (1.014) (1 .736) (1 .453)
Information 93.603 99.528 68.742* 72.144*
aid volatility (59.982) (65.349) (40.675) (38.187)
Aid vol.

aid
gdp

2.270 4.152 8.012* 11.027***
info. (5 .136) (5 .815) (4 .553) (3 .453)
Population -0.346 -0.639 -0.416 -0.358 -0.724 -2.206** -2.541 -2.200**
growth (0 .804) (0 .855) (0 .798) (0 .850) (1.711) (0.960) (1 .680) (1 .022)
Log GDP pc 2.629 2.011 2.673 2.940 3.382** 0.776 0.343 0.102
(3 .015) (3 .403) (3 .155) (3 .627) (1.425) (1.323) (1 .485) (1 .130)
M2/GDP (lag) -0.011 -0.007 0.036 0.025 0.037 0.081* 0.098** 0.084***
(0 .037) (0 .040) (0 .058) (0 .061) (0.032) (0.047) (0 .039) (0 .029)
Freedom House 4.593 1.198 -0.420 0.551
(4 .509) (4 .379) (4 .059) (4 .760)
Intercept -12.763 2.715 -11.032 9.720 -21.225 0.067 -2.057 3.468
(27.618) (16.671) (25.477) (22.092) (12.922) (9 .047) (9 .408) (10.128)
N 346 321 346 321 275 257 275 257
R2 0.697 0.700 0.714 0.719
2 152.655 172.757 5575.509 15805.709
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
All the regressions include period xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
a: The regressions include country xed e¤ects (coe¢ cients not reported).
b: Robust standard errors and cluster(countries).
c: Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
Notes: The variables are described in more detail in the text. The dependent
variable is the growth rate of GDP.
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Figure 6: Marginal E¤ect of Aid on Growth As Information and Aid Volatility Change
5.4.3 Robustness Check
One of the main weaknesses of system GMM estimators is that they can generate moment
conditions prolically, with the instrument count quadratic in the time dimension of the
panel. This can cause several problems in nite samples (Roodman, 2006a): (i) it can
weaken the Hansen test to the point where it generates implausibly good p values of
1.000 (Anderson and Sorenson, 1996; Bowsher, 2002); and (ii) it can overt endogenous
variables.
So one has to test the robustness of the results to reducing the instrument count. I
do so by limiting the lags used in GMM-style instruments20. In Table 7, I present the
results of the main estimations of the paper after limiting the lags. It appears that (i)
the results are still robust, and that (ii) the validity of the instruments is still accepted
by the Hasen J-test of over-identifying restrictions.
5.5 A Possible Concern: Information Endogeneity
Both the theoretical and the empirical parts of this paper underline the importance of
information and of transparency for aid e¢ ciency. However, the level of transparency
20 I obtain similar results when I collapse the instrument count.
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TABLE 7: ROBUSTNESS CHECK
(LIMITING THE LAGS)
Estimation System System System System System System System System
method GMMa GMMa GMMa GMMa GMMa GMMa GMMa GMMa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
aid
gdp
-1.049* -0.840* 0.432 -0.175 0.628* 0.340* 0.633 1.008
(0.547) (0.459) (0.312) (0.183) (0.321) (0.204) (0.840) (0.727)
aid
gdp
2
-0.017**
(0.008)
Relea. info. -6.970 0.035 -35.527* 8.121 -0.812
(9.519) (9.375) (19.830) (18.277) (15.344)
Aid vol. -10.333*** -112.552** -0.953 -3.295 -44.923** -51.278**
(3.648) (50.555) (3.842) (2.902) (21.325) (24.474)
aid
gdp
×info. 2.655* 3.145** -1.202 -2.244
(1.355) (1.284) (1.998) (1.639)
aid
gdp
2
×info -0.067
(0.055)
aid
gdp
×aid vol -2.617*** -2.461*** -4.477** -5.620***
(0.898) (0.903) (2.015) (1.739)
Information× 192.451** 68.820* 82.302*
aid volatility (87.619) (37.906) (43.441)
Aid vol.× aid
gdp
8.397 11.547***
×info (5.516) (4.092)
Population -1.385* -1.061 -1.706 -1.489 -0.798 -2.306** -2.124 -2.427**
growth (0.797) (1.233) (1.111) (1.418) (1.731) (0.989) (1.680) (1.137)
Log GDP pc 0.759 1.868 0.366 0.180 3.500** 0.857 0.465 -0.053
(1.203) (1.663) (1.226) (1.109) (1.549) (1.367) (1.478) (1.010)
M2/GDP 0.073 0.060 0.126** 0.065*** 0.034 0.080** 0.091* 0.088***
(lag) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055) (0.025) (0.034) (0.040) (0.038) (0.031)
Freedom 5.160* 3.439 2.867 3.184 0.125 -0.320
House (3.066) (4.540) (4.632) (4.204) (3.996) (4.727)
Intercept -3.209 -15.253 -2.676 20.972* -22.093 -0.997 -2.695 6.703
(9.439) (15.473) (10.985) (10.844) (13.906) (9.458) (10.477) (9.535)
N 257 257 257 257 275 257 275 257
e2 535.186 493.231 208.168 188.432 147.106 166.492 5668.74 6270.46
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All the regressions include period fixed effects (coefficients not reported).
a: Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.
Notes: The variables are described in more detail in the text. The dependent variable is the grow th rate of GDP.
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across countries is highly correlated with other institutional characteristics that are, in
the long run, likely to be codetermined. I thus need to check whether my results do not
su¤er from an omitted variables bias, being just capturing the fact that aid e¢ ciency
is higher in countries with better institutions, since more transparent countries tend to
have more favorable institutional features in general. In a recent paper, Glennerster
and Shin (2008), who dene transparency as the accuracy and frequency of economic
information released to the public, successfully overcome this di¢ culty by studying the
data generated during 1999-2002 when the IMF introduced a series of reforms to promote
transparency21.
Here, due to the fact that my dataset covers a much longer time period and a higher
number of countries, I cannot use this instrument. However, even if I do not have a good
instrumental strategy for release of information and I cannot use a natural experiment,
I run di¤erent checks that give supporting results according to which I am not capturing
the positive e¤ect of institutions.
First, it is important to underline that the measure of information I use the release
of information indicator of Williams (2009) is very weakly correlated with usual mea-
sures of institutions (the augmented Freedom House political rights index, the Polity
IV index, and the dichotomous democracy index developed by Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub, and Limongi (2000a) and augmented by Boix and Rosato (2001)), as shown in
Table 8.
TABLE 8: CORRELATION BETWEEN RELEASE OF INFORMATION
INDICATOR AND USUAL MEASURES OF INSTITUTIONS
Polity IV Freedom House Przeworski Democracy Release Info
Polity IV 1
Freedom House 0.8025 1
Przeworski Democracy 0.5826 0.6146 1
Release Info 0.2475 0.3652 0.1330 1
Moreover, in all the di¤erent specications I use, I nd no positive and statistically
signicant direct impact of release of information on growth. If what I was capturing
using the release of information indicator was the impact of good institutions, I should
have found a positive impact of information on growth.
21 Indeed, the IMFs preexisting internal timetable for country reports introduced exogenous variation
when countries were faced with the option to become more transparent.
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Finally, when I introduce an institutional measure (Freedom House) as a control in
my regressions, it does not modify the results. On the contrary, it even increases both
the positive impact and the statistical signicance of the release of information indicator.
Thus, it seems that what I am capturing is actually the positive impact of information
and transparency and not the one of institutions.
6 CONCLUSION
Using a political economy model of rent extraction, I have shown that asymmetric infor-
mation sharply reduces aid e¢ ciency. In particular, aid ows received by the policymaker
can have substantial multiplicative e¤ects under asymmetric information. Moreover, aid
volatility has di¤erent e¤ects depending on whether or not the amount of aid ows is
observed by the citizens. All other things being equal, more aid volatility results in an
increase in the probability that the o¢ ceholder embezzles aid completely, thus providing
no public good. Consequently, I identify a new channel the "asymmetric information"
channel  through which aid volatility is costly for recipient countries. Using various
empirical methods on a cross-country panel of developing countries and computing new
yearly estimates of aid volatility, I have conrmed the empirical relevance of the model.
On the one hand, I have found that more "news" increases aid e¢ ciency, using a release
of information indicator. On the other hand, the negative impact of aid volatility on
aid e¢ ciency vanishes when private information is revealed such that it is no longer
asymmetric.
This preliminary evidence is along the lines of recent micro studies on private servants
incentives. These studies emphasize that the need for more accountability comes hand-in-
hand with a need for more transparency (Olken, 2007; Duo, Kremer, and Glennerster,
2006). Recent case studies have thus shown that more transparency can reduce corruption
and make the use of resources more e¤ective. The example of the Ugandan newspapers
campaign is the most striking. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) found that only 13% of
central government transfers to local primary schools in Uganda arrived at destination.
To deal with this problem, the Ugandan central government took the bold measure
of publishing intended transfers by school in local newspapers where they could be
monitored by parents and local o¢ cials. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) then found that
this newspapers campaign successfully increased the proportion of transfers that arrived
at schools from 13 percent to over 80 percent. Similarly, Besley and Burgess (2002)
provide evidence for the role of local newspapers in increasing the responsiveness of
Indian state governments to natural disaster. In the same way, since the incentives
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facing incumbents in recipient countries seem too weak for them to have an interest in
providing public goods rather than extracting rents, the introduction of more information
can appear as a good way to increase aid e¢ ciency at low cost. This is in the spirit of
the DFID "Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative", the idea being to "publish
what you pay".
A Appendix A: Innitely Repeated Case
I distinguish two strategies for the incumbent:
1. I rst consider all histories without defection: in this case, the strategy of the
incumbent is stationary: she chooses to be reelected (and so to satisfy the citizens
reservation utility) at each stage of the entire game.
2. At a time T , there is a one-shot deviation: the incumbent chooses not to be
reelected and to embezzle all the aid ows.
1. In the non defection case, the incumbent payo¤ can be written as follows:
1X
t=0
tE

t   egt +R
2. In the one-shot deviation case, it can be written as follows:PT 1
t=0 
tE

t   egt +R+ T (T +R) +P1t=T+1 0
=
PT 1
t=0 
tE

t   egt +R+ T (T +R) :
The incumbent chooses the non-defection rather than the one-shot deviation strategy
i¤ P1
t=0 
tE

t   egt +R PT 1t=0 tEt   egt +R+ T (T +R)
,P1t=T tEt   egt +R  T (T +R)
,P1t=T tEegt  T1    +R  T (T +R) :
At time T , the citizen has to determine her reservation utility egT : She chooses egT
such that
TegT  T1     +R  T (T +R) 
1X
t=T+1
tE
egt : (16)
Moreover, since she wants to maximize her utility, (16) is binding:
TegT = T1     +R  T (T +R) 
1X
t=T+1
tE
egt : (17)
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Each period t, the citizen will follow the same strategy (the one which consists in
giving the incumbent just enough for her not to choose to embezzle all aid ows22).
The reservation utility of the citizen egt will then be a function of t: egt = egt (t). As
a consequence, the expectation of egt depends on that of t. However, E (t) =  (it is
independent of t) and so egt is also independent of t: Eegt = eg:
Thus (17) can be rewritten as follows:
egT =  +R1     (T +R)  1  eg =  +R  e
g
1     (T +R) : (18)
In this case, the incumbent will always prefer the non defection rather than the
one-shot deviation strategy and so will satisfy the reservation utility of the citizen.
We can now generalize this result.
Proposition 3 Each period t the incumbent will provide the citizen with an amount of
public good
gt =
egt =  +R  eg1     (t +R) : (19)
We need now to determine the value of eg in the RHS of equation (19). We know
that each period t equation (19) is satised, but that the players can only anticipate the
value of  and so consider its average. So we have
eg = +R eg1      +R
, eg =  +R  (1  )   +R : (20)
Plugging eg into equation (19),
egt = +R [+R (1 )(+R)]1    (t +R)
, egt = (1 + )  + R  t : (21)
Proposition 4 The incumbent always chooses to be reelected and each period t, she
provides the citizen with an amount of public good
gt = (1 + )  + R  t: (22)
If we now turn to aid e¢ ciency (proxied by the share of the aid ows used to provide
public goods rather than extracted as rents), we obtain that:
gt
t
= min

(1 + )  + R
t
  ; 1

: (23)
So aid e¢ ciency is increasing in the average amount of aid ows and decreasing in the
current amount of aid ows. This has important political implications. On the one
22 It is never in her interest to deviate since her alternative payo¤ is equal to 0.
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hand, this means that when one increases the average amount of aid ows provided to a
recipient country, it increases aid e¢ ciency (and so that there are increasing rather than
decreasing returns to aid ows). On the other hand, this means that a one-shot positive
shock on aid ows has a negative impact on aid e¢ ciency since it increases the share of
aid rents extracted by the incumbent. Thus donor countries do not have to compensate
low average amounts of aid shocks by time to time (ine¢ cient) increase in aid ows, but
should rather prefer a smooth increase in the providing amounts of aid.
Moreover
(1+)+R
t
    1
, t  (1+)+R1+ :
Proposition 5 Each period t, aid e¢ ciency is such that(
gt
t
= 1 if t  (1+)+R1+
gt
t
= (1+)+Rt    otherwise
: (24)
Appendix B: Data Sources and Description
Aid: Net Aid Transfers (NAT). Source: DAC.
Concentration: measure of the geographic dispersion of the population. Based
on population data for 400 km2 cells, this is a dispersion index, or Gini coe¢ cient of
population dispersion for each country. The minimum value of 0 indicates that the popu-
lation is evenly distributed across the country while a maximum value of 1 indicates that
the total population is concentrated in one area. Source: Democracy and Development
Extended Data Set.
Democracy: dichotomous democracy index developed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub,
and Limongi (2000b) and augmented by Boix and Rosato (2001).
Freedom House Political Rights Index: index normalized between 0 and 1, with
0 corresponding to the least democratic set of institutions and 1 to the most. Source:
Freedom House.
GDP growth rate: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based
on constant local currency. Source: WDI (2006).
GDP per capita: GDP at market prices based on constant local currency, normal-
ized by the country population. Source: WDI (2006).
M2 (% GDP):Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks,
demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. Source:
WDI (2006).
Polity 4 index (0 to1): aggregate score obtained as the di¤erence between democ-
racy and autocracy. Source: Polity 4 Project, UMD.
Population growth: Annual percentage growth rate of the population. Source:
WDI (2006).
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Release of information: indicator based on the quantity of reported socio-economic
data contained in the World Development Indicators and the International Finance Sta-
tistics databases. Source: Williams (2009).
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TABLE A1: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SUMMARY STATISTICS
Per capita GDP growth Aid Aid Release of
GDP (percent over Volatility information
Country in 1970 per annum) GDP indicator
Algeria 1719.21 3.26 0.45 0.07 0.45
Argentina 4168.62 2.23 0.06 0.19 0.61
Armenia 492.55 -7.70 8.40 1.83 0.40
Azerbaijan 653.68 -10.78 1.86 3.40 0.38
Bangladesh 176.78 3.99 5.45 0.10 0.51
Belize 2167.58 5.86 7.13 0.08 0.41
Benin 305.36 3.31 9.73 0.02 0.46
Bhutan 427.58 7.40 14.73 0.02 0.22
Bolivia 628.61 2.17 6.60 0.11 0.60
Botswana 1697.70 9.21 7.14 0.03 0.46
Burkina Faso 223.01 3.95 12.64 0.03 0.37
Burundi 164.51 1.97 15.77 0.06 0.40
Cameroon 669.25 3.87 3.61 0.08 0.42
Cape Verde 1080.18 5.47 29.52 0.03 0.31
Central African Republic 297.32 1.19 13.17 0.04 0.34
Chad 212.18 2.72 12.64 0.07 0.34
China 9.10 0.36 0.34 0.47
Colombia 1252.63 4.04 0.20 0.25 0.67
Comoros 433.71 2.43 27.09 0.02 0.21
Congo. Dem. Rep. 290.52 -1.75 3.57 0.11 0.36
Cote dIvoire 768.25 2.65 3.97 0.06 0.49
Cyprus 6641.79 7.77 2.03 0.14 0.59
Dominica 2128.79 3.66 13.93 0.12 0.41
Ecuador 1147.02 3.50 1.08 0.11 0.57
Egypt. Arab. Rep. 701.62 5.96 7.27 0.18 0.56
Ethiopia 136.18 2.78 9.29 0.05 0.38
Fiji 1670.81 2.26 2.98 0.02 0.50
Gambia. The 280.11 3.94 22.67 0.07 0.39
Ghana 341.91 2.19 6.03 0.10 0.53
Grenada 2066.76 4.00 8.02 0.16 0.36
Guatemala 1067.42 3.12 1.43 0.10 0.51
Guyana 647.60 1.25 9.27 0.24 0.43
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TABLE A1: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SUMMARY STATISTICS
(CONTINUED)
Per capita GDP growth Aid Aid Release of
GDP (percent over Volatility information
Country in 1970 per annum) GDP indicator
Haiti 299.04 0.49 8.52 0.23 0.44
India 5.11 0.72 0.07 0.59
Indonesia 7.08 0.99 0.15 0.59
Israel 8675.91 4.48 3.57 0.22 0.63
Jordan 1442.40 7.26 15.52 0.20 0.54
Kenya 312.30 3.76 6.77 0.05 0.57
Kuwait 12269.85 6.54 0.02 0.58 0.52
Lao PDR 328.32 5.52 10.77 0.13 0.25
Lebanon 2381.88 -5.92 3.32 0.14 0.26
Lesotho 317.77 5.90 19.95 0.02 0.41
Liberia 293.44 -2.90 24.95 0.22 0.24
Madagascar 274.22 0.88 7.78 0.06 0.46
Malawi 165.92 3.70 17.42 0.05 0.38
Maldives 1141.31 10.17 16.35 0.19 0.27
Mali 205.54 2.82 17.61 0.05 0.44
Mauritania 400.28 2.80 24.71 0.07 0.39
Mauritius 2337.69 5.47 2.46 0.53 0.51
Moldova 439.18 -2.87 1.74 0.35 0.45
Mongolia 401.78 3.71 22.23 0.04 0.28
Morocco 835.77 3.99 2.97 0.14 0.58
Mozambique 214.07 2.77 24.61 0.11 0.36
Nepal 160.48 4.34 8.31 0.03 0.49
Nicaragua 651.84 0.20 11.30 0.27 0.53
Niger 255.33 1.85 13.35 0.06 0.34
Nigeria 418.64 2.46 0.40 0.16 0.54
Pakistan 235.04 5.45 2.77 0.08 0.62
Panama 2211.34 3.12 0.99 0.20 0.56
Papua New Guinea 826.74 2.84 11.64 0.02 0.49
Paraguay 1173.82 4.94 1.39 0.11 0.58
Peru 1283.54 2.36 1.03 0.07 0.59
Philippines 654.10 3.31 1.45 0.06 0.65
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TABLE A1: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SUMMARY STATISTICS
(CONTINUED)
Per capita GDP growth Aid Aid Release of
GDP (percent over Volatility information
Country in 1970 per annum) GDP indicator
Rwanda 221.85 3.27 18.49 0.13 0.44
Senegal 486.96 2.75 11.21 0.04 0.54
Seychelles 4311.50 4.63 10.23 0.05 0.43
Sierra Leone 221.01 -0.78 9.85 0.10 0.34
Slovenia 8393.71 0.25 0.17 0.49 0.59
Solomon Islands 678.09 6.99 22.31 0.08 0.35
South Africa 2589.24 2.09 0.16 0.01 0.66
Sri Lanka 451.45 4.81 6.49 0.05 0.58
St. Kitts and Nevis 4356.25 5.60 5.95 0.64 0.36
St. Lucia 2652.71 5.29 5.01 0.64 0.40
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1745.84 3.56 9.12 0.41 0.40
Sudan 395.55 4.39 5.78 0.11 0.44
Suriname 2062.51 0.79 9.11 0.56 0.42
Tanzania 85.69 3.26 18.69 0.04 0.41
Thailand 1183.79 7.33 0.76 0.06 0.67
Togo 322.19 2.93 10.75 0.05 0.52
Tonga 851.50 2.15 22.48 0.07 0.35
Tunisia 1294.01 4.80 2.39 0.32 0.57
Uganda 221.03 4.85 8.48 0.29 0.39
Uruguay 3140.80 2.66 0.27 0.78 0.58
Vanuatu 1100.30 2.42 25.24 0.05 0.47
Yemen. Rep. 385.56 5.87 4.83 0.05 0.47
Zambia 453.85 0.88 13.34 0.26 0.49
Zimbabwe 698.06 3.25 3.38 0.19 0.45
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